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  • Tempest today

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    Hi list,
    I've seen some fuss about the technique called "tempest" lately. Some
    people claim it would be "the thing" in modern security. This bugs me
    somehow because first of all I think it is way to much of an effort
    compared to the more casual techniques used today. Also all information
    that I can find on the Internet refers to some stuff the NSA released in
    the mid-nineties. Now that is not really a good and reliable source of
    information in my believe. :)
    Can anybody tell me how far evolved this technique is today and who uses
    it? Maybe some reference to a whitepaper or something similar. Would be
    great.
    Thanks
    Paul
    Brief definition of tempest for those who have never heard of it:
    Picking up the radiation produced by a monitor or cables that connect
    the graphics-card or graphics-chipset with the monitor in order to spy
    the screen of the user. Kind of like getting access to a VNC server on
    the box without having input yourself. The interesting part is that it
    is technically undetectable.
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  • No.1 | | 544 bytes | |

    Fri, 2006-08-18 at 18:45 +0200, Paul Sebastian Ziegler wrote:
    Can anybody tell me how far evolved this technique is today and who
    uses
    it? Maybe some reference to a whitepaper or something similar. Would
    be
    great.

    than the NSA, you mean?

    By the way, Tempest did/does not just refer to picking up signals from
    monitors and keyboards, almost any kind of electronic device emits
    signals.

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  • No.2 | | 1081 bytes | |

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    Joe Barr wrote:
    Fri, 2006-08-18 at 18:45 +0200, Paul Sebastian Ziegler wrote:
    >Can anybody tell me how far evolved this technique is today and who
    >uses
    >it? Maybe some reference to a whitepaper or something similar. Would
    >be
    >great.
    >

    than the NSA, you mean?

    By the way, Tempest did/does not just refer to picking up signals from
    monitors and keyboards, almost any kind of electronic device emits
    signals.
    --

    Yeah I was hoping for something else than the NSA-papers.

    my definition was a inaccurate. The fuss I hear about is on picking
    up the monitor's signal, however of course about anything can be picked
    up this way.

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  • No.3 | | 959 bytes | |

    Paul Sebastian Ziegler wrote:
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    Hi list,

    Can anybody tell me how far evolved this technique is today and who uses
    it? Maybe some reference to a whitepaper or something similar. Would be
    great.

    Did you mean Van Eck Phreaking EM eavesdropping, or TEMPEST itself.
    TEMPEST is the solution for EM eavesdropping. If you're talking about
    Van Eck Phreaking, I'm not sure you're going to get much information
    from people explaining how they're doing it (eavesdropping) and what
    they're using to do it. That "WULD/CULD" be akin to a criminal walking
    into a police station explaining how he robbed that bank. TSCM has a lot
    of information on this kind of stuff http://www.tscm.com/ and a lot of
    knowledgeable people who interact with each other. You might be better
    off seeing what's happening in governmentland though:

    See their reference notes:
  • No.4 | | 561 bytes | |

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    Thanks to everyone, I got enough info to suffice.
    It's good to see that just asking a question still provides an answer
    without paying thousands of dollars or sliding into several networks.

    Thanks!
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  • No.5 | | 1385 bytes | |

    I had not seen a realistic, working public example until I picked up
    on this just the other day. Granted, it's sketchy on details, but
    assuming it is a honest example it is impressive.

    Everything else seemed to reference the original 1985 article on the
    subject by Van Eck where he used a television to pick up the signal
    from a VDU.

    8/18/06, J. <sil (AT) infiltrated (DOT) netwrote:

    Paul Sebastian Ziegler wrote:
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    Hi list,

    Can anybody tell me how far evolved this technique is today and who uses
    it? Maybe some reference to a whitepaper or something similar. Would be
    great.

    Did you mean Van Eck Phreaking EM eavesdropping, or TEMPEST itself.
    TEMPEST is the solution for EM eavesdropping. If you're talking about
    Van Eck Phreaking, I'm not sure you're going to get much information
    from people explaining how they're doing it (eavesdropping) and what
    they're using to do it. That "WULD/CULD" be akin to a criminal walking
    into a police station explaining how he robbed that bank. TSCM has a lot
    of information on this kind of stuff http://www.tscm.com/ and a lot of
    knowledgeable people who interact with each other. You might be better
    off seeing what's happening in governmentland though:

    See their reference notes:
  • No.6 | | 198 bytes | |

    you may try playing with this:
    http://eckbox.sourceforge.net/
    -KF
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  • No.7 | | 7049 bytes | |

    , here is something from the book that I was trying to assemble/write.

    Some Links: http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm/tempest.html
    http://www.erikyyy.de/tempest/

    Lets

    Faraday cages may be used to provide protection from HERF and EMP effects.

    Countermeasures:
    It is easy to defeat ordinary audio eavesdropping, just by
    sound-proofing a room. And simply drawing the curtains or creating a
    specially crafted background noise or by using double glass with air
    gap in the middle can soundproof and can defeat newer systems, which
    shine a laser beam onto a glass window and decode any modulation of
    the reflected beam caused by sound vibrations in the room.

    Faraday's cage: The charge on a charged conductor resided only on its
    exterior, and had no influence on anything enclosed within it. To
    demonstrate this fact he built a room coated with metal foil, and
    allowed high-voltage discharges from an electrostatic generator to
    strike the outside of the room. He used an electroscope to show that
    there was no electric charge present on the inside of the room's
    walls. A Faraday cage is best understood as an approximation to an
    ideal hollow conductor. A round drum, sphere etc can act like a
    Faraday's Cage. Basically, the enclosure may be made of an unbroken
    conducting sheet, like the metal box surrounding a sensitive radio
    receiver, or a wire mesh, like that in the door of a microwave oven.
    Any holes in the box or mesh must be significantly smaller than the
    wavelength of the radiation that is being kept out, or the enclosure
    will not effectively approximate an unbroken conducting surface.

    This shielding effect is used to eliminate electric fields within a
    volume, for example to protect electronic equipment from lightning
    strikes and other electrostatic discharges (ESDs). Faraday cages are
    often put to a dual purpose: to block electric fields, as explained
    above, and to block electromagnetic radiation. The latter application
    is known as RF shielding.

    Some traditional architectural materials act as Faraday shields in
    practice. These include plaster with wire mesh, and rebar concrete.
    These will affect the use of cordless phones and wireless networks
    inside buildings and houses. While Some buildings have designs that
    block radio signals by accident due to thick concrete walls or a steel
    skeleton.
    RF and Magnetic shielding: Radio frequency (or RF) shielding is
    required when it is necessary to block high frequency - 100 kilohertz
    and above - interference fields. These shields typically use copper,
    aluminum, galvanized steel, or conductive rubber, plastic or paints.
    These materials work at high frequencies by means of their high
    conductivity, and little or no magnetic permeability. Magnetic shields
    use their high permeability to attract magnetic fields and divert the
    magnetic energy through them. With proper construction, magnetic
    shielding alloys have the ability to function as broadband shields,
    shielding both rf and magnetic interference fields.

    Electromagnetic shielding: It is the process of limiting the coupling
    of an electromagnetic field between two locations. Typically it is
    applied to enclosures, separating electrical content from the outside
    world, and to cables, separating internal wires from the environment
    the cable runs through. The shielding is achieved using a conductive
    material as a barrier. Typical materials include sheet metal, metal
    mesh, ionized gas, plasma and aluminum foil. The shielding can reduce
    the coupling of radio waves, visible light, electromagnetic fields and
    electrostatic fields. The amount of reduction depends very much upon
    the material used, the method of connection of the shield (or screen)
    and the frequency of the fields of interest. example is a coaxial
    cable, which has electromagnetic shielding in the form of a wire mesh
    surrounding an inner core conductor. The shielding impedes the escape
    of any signal from the core conductor, and also signals from being
    added to the core conductor.

    Though i have practically seen putting a dipole near the coaxial cable
    can sniff its signal within despite the sealing. The rf sealing strict
    depends on the quality which i've seen is rare in MST commercial
    products for general uses.

    Shielded Tent: It Shielded enclosures, tempest equipment, shielded
    chambers Another way of making sure you are not being bugged is to use
    a shielded tent, which prevents radio waves entering or leaving.
    Though Mobile phone calls are impossible from inside the tent, but
    no-one will be able to listen to your conversations using bugs or
    radio wave listening devices. It will also prevent anyone intercepting
    radio emissions from computers, preventing them from seeing what you
    have on screen. A more sophisticated - and expensive - method is to
    build a "clean room", of the type used by the military, to shield
    radio waves and electromagnetic signals.

    Wireless Shielding Paint: A company, Force Field Wireless makes three
    products that it says can dramatically reduce the leakage of wireless
    signals from a room or building. The paint contains copper filings and
    an aluminum compound. When spread evenly on a wall, the paint reflects
    signals in frequencies from 100 MHz to 5 GHz. Paint four walls, a
    floor, and a ceiling, and you effectively have a Faraday cage, which
    is a specially constructed metal room that blocks all radio signals in
    or out. It also makes copper/aluminum powder that homeowners can add
    to their own paint. The company also makes a window film that cuts
    down on signal leakage. This product DefendAir would be an attractive
    option to
    protect an RFID-enabled warehouse.

    Critic: Though wireless signals are very hard to completely block.
    They will simply radiate over and around obstacles. Metallic paint
    might reduce the signal strength, but that's easily compensated for by
    an antenna. Further-more its drawbacks are like it could reduce
    cellular reception. Any such technology won't block all signal - it
    won't block signal eminating from windows, doors, and screw holes.
    What it will do is lower the range from which you can sniff or
    connect, with constant equipment, which is plenty to be useful for
    some cases. Like a building situated near the center of a military
    base. Up to a quarterkilometer away is secured area. But obviously it
    will help you lower the sniffable range of the radiation to
    within that security perimeter and it's possible to arrange any
    conductive medium to actually amplify RF signals in a given direction
    You are quite likely to find a spot where the signal is considerably
    stronger.

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